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Family Law 
and Human Equality 
Canadian s o c i e t y i s a caste system 
based on sex. The Women's Movement 
appreciates t h i s f a c t but has not yet 
given top p r i o r i t y to generating a r -
t i c u l a t e c r i t i c i s m of the root cause 
of i n v i d i o u s sexual d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n 
t h i s country. That cause is the law 
of the fa m i l y - - a mediaeval s t r a i t -
j a c k e t that i s comprised of equal parts 
of le g a l f i c t i o n s , economic i n j u s t i c e s 
and s c i e n t i f i c a l l y untenable behavioural 
assumptions, and that s h e l t e r s from 
c r i t i c i s m behind a facade of pious V i c -
t o r i a n moral hypocrisy. In a d d i t i o n , 
f a m i l y law rides the c o a t t a i l s of mar-
ri a g e as a sacred i n s t i t u t i o n and the 
fam i l y as the basis f o r our c u l t u r e and 
c i v i l i z a t i o n . If marriage and the 
fam i l y are good t h i n g s , then i t is an 
easy step to the assumption that the 
law that defines marriage and the f a m i l y 
must a l s o be good. 
It is not. The law of the family in 
general and the philosophy of that law 
in p a r t i c u l a r i s , in 1975, an outrage 
to our c o l l e c t i v e humanity and the 
source of more human s u f f e r i n g and 
genuine pain than almost any other doc-
t r i n e or ideology ever created by the 
mind of man--and the word "man" is used 
here, with complete accuracy, to i n d i -
cate gender. 
The catalogue of shortcomings of family 
law encompasses almost i t s e n t i r e body. 
To deal with b a s i c premises, however, 
reform must concentrate on that part of 
the law de a l i n g with family economics. 
It is here that we f i n d the key to 
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meaningful change. This i s a l s o the 
area where the Women's Movement has 
f a l l e n s i g n i f i c a n t l y short of i t s poten-
t i a l as a c a t a l y s t f o r such change. 
We are a l l f a m i l i a r with the voice of 
women speaking out against Dick being 
shown as t a l l e r than Jane in the Grade 
Three Reader. This i s the attack on 
the d e p i c t i o n of woman as a "weakness 
symbol." And the Women's Movement has 
been equally vocal on a d v e r t i s i n g , 
c l o t h i n g and other phenomenon that por-
tray woman as a "sex symbol." These, 
however, are but pe r i p h e r a l issues and 
serve only to d i s s i p a t e the energies 
that should be focused on the law of 
marriage and the family that depicts 
woman as a "dependency symbol." Be-
cause we l i v e in the realm of law, 
t h i s symbol not only profoundly i n -
fluences i n d i v i d u a l and community 
a t t i t u d e s , but a l s o , as the major 
term in the lega l s y l l o g i s m , clothes 
the d i s t o r t i o n s that f o l l o w from 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n based on sex through-
out family law with a l l the a t t r a c -
tiveness of a l o g i c a l arrangement. 
Reform of family law must not concern 
i t s e l f with whether or not the courts 
are proceeding from premises to con-
c l u s i o n s without making mistakes. By 
t h i s c r i t e r i o n , d e c i s i o n s such as 
Murdoch vs Murdoch are completely 
d e f e n s i b l e . Rather we must concern 
ourselves with the question of whether 
Parliament and the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s -
l a t u r e s are g i v i n g the courts the 
r i g h t premises with which to work in 
the l a s t quarter of the twentieth 
century. 
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Such problems, whether they be with 
i n d i v i d u a l court d e c i s i o n s , school 
readers, advertisements or what have 
you, are j u s t the f r o t h that obscures 
from our v i s i o n the f a c t that marriage 
is the primary r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the sexes, and as such, is the primary 
source and primary j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
sexually-based d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in so-
c i e t y . The m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i s so 
fundamental that every other aspect of 
our c u l t u r e pales in comparison. Our 
economy and the power s t r u c t u r e in the 
s o c i e t y are organized around the family 
and marriage. Whatever assumptions 
govern the family and marriage, a l s o 
determine the shape of the community 
and the n a t i o n , and determine who has 
what o p p o r t u n i t i e s , what r i g h t s and 
what r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s not only in the 
matrimonial home, but a l s o in that 
large world that l i e s beyond i t . Family 
law reform i s not j u s t one goal among 
many--it i s the keystone of the arch of 
human e q u a l i t y . 
One basic assumption of family l a w — p e r -
haps the most d e s t r u c t i v e one of a l l — 
is that marriage i s s o c i e t y ' s primary 
v e h i c l e f o r meeting the economic needs 
of women. The law books contain i n -
stances of divor c e judges who conduct 
a le g a l a p p r a i s a l of a woman's chance 
of remarrying when they are deciding 
how much her ex-husband has to pay her. 
If she f i t s the current stereotype of 
female p u l c h r i t u d e , her needs are less 
because she has a good chance of re-
marriage. It is probable that few 
judges ever have the time or opportun-
i t y to look beyond the hard-headed 
p r a c t i c a l i t y of t h i s to the economic 
p r o p o s i t i o n that i t stands f o i — t h a t 
i s , an acknowledgement that a woman 
is c o n v e n t i o n a l l y expected to get her 
share of the country's goods and s e r -
v i c e s from a man as h i s dependent, 
rather than on her own, and that the 
economy, as w e l l as the law of the 
fa m i l y , i s based on t h i s arrangement. 
The message to women i s loud and c l e a r : 
devote your primary energies to a t t a c h -
ing y o u r s e l f to a man rather than 
developing your i n d i v i d u a l p o t e n t i a l as 
a person. 
What is e q u a l l y d e s t r u c t i v e i s the 
acknowledgement that i t i s a part of 
the philosophy of the law of the land 
that a woman's chances of g e t t i n g her 
f a i r share depend upon her sexual 
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s to those who have the 
monopoly on the economic technostructure. 
Imagine the cabinet shake-ups i f a man's 
route to the top depended on h i s sex 
appeal! Which sex would be t o l d that 
they spent too much time f u s s i n g over 
t h e i r h a i r i f that were the case? 
It i s time to put that philosophy of the 
r o l e of women behind us, as w e l l as the 
p a r t i c u l a r r u l e in which i t is embodied; 
the female dependency r u l e . So long as 
the law continues to give any support 
to the idea that in the primary r e l a t i o n -
ship between men and women, women as a 
c l a s s , are to be supported f o r l i f e and 
men, as a c l a s s , must support them, then 
women w i l l continue to be excluded on 
the basis of t h e i r sex from meaningful 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s ( i n the sense that men 
have meaningful o p p o r t u n i t i e s ) i n the 
s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c techno-
s t r u c t u r e . 
One reason f o r t h i s i s f a i r l y obvious. 
The s t r u g g l e f o r wealth and power i n 
which a l l men engage i s e s s e n t i a l l y a 
competition. A male competitor re-
quired by law to share the t a n g i b l e 
f r u i t s of hi s labours w i t h h i s w i f e 
c a r r i e s a handicap and w i l l r e s i s t the 
idea of sharing the l i m i t e d opportun-
i t i e s f o r advancement w i t h those whom 
he knows are a r b i t r a r i l y exempted from 
t h i s burden by reason o f sex. This i s 
best summed up i n the o f t e n heard 
argument: "Why should she get the job 
or the promotion when I'm the one 
responsible to support a f a m i l y . " This 
view i s a s u b t l e but real c h a r a c t e r i s -
t i c of most h i r i n g and promotion 
p r a c t i c e s and e x i s t s independently of 
those o r d i n a r y i r r a t i o n a l fears or re-
sentment of women colleagues that con-
s t i t u t e pure sexual p r e j u d i c e . 
A second reason i s less obvious, per-
haps because i t seems a l t o g e t h e r too 
p r i m i t i v e to a f a s t i d i o u s c u l t u r e the 
apparent major concerns of which are 
things l i k e " r i n g around the c o l l a r " 
and the avoidance of "wax bu i l d u p " on 
kitche n f l o o r s - - a s i d e of human nature 
that we seldom care to acknowledge. 
This i s the ba s i c d r i v e to mate and 
reproduce. In our s o c i e t y , the accep-
t a b l e o u t l e t f o r t h i s , which i s without 
doubt one of the primary f a c t o r s i n -
f l u e n c i n g most human behaviour, i s the 
i n s t i t u t i o n of matrimony. The lega l 
requirements a f f e c t i n g marriage there-
f o r e d i c t a t e the c u l t u r a l manifestations 
of the need f o r sexual bonding. People 
w i l l tend to behave in whatever way i s 
necessary in order to ob t a i n a mate. 
Given that the law makes the man the 
so l e provider (which i s an i n h e r i t e d 
phenomenon flowing from complex h i s -
t o r i c , r e l i g i o u s and economic f o r c e s ) , 
i t f o l l o w s that the good provider has 
a greater chance of s a t i s f y i n g h i s need 
to marry. Even where the a b i l i t y to 
marry i s present in any event, so that 
absolute d e p r i v a t i o n i s not a primary 
f a c t o r , the economically powerful man 
has a greater s e l e c t i o n of women from 
whom to choose a partner. 
Women, on the other hand, are informed 
by our c u l t u r e that being a good pro-
v i d e r does not n e c e s s a r i l y give them 
any advantage in seeking to marry, 
w h i l e c u l t i v a t i o n of domestic or "fem-
i n i n e " v i r t u e s and sexual a t t r a c t i v e -
ness does. Since they tend to be ex-
cluded from the economy, marriage i t s e l f 
becomes t h e i r entry i n t o adult s o c i e t y , 
the primary v e h i c l e f o r expression of 
t h e i r a b i l i t i e s and the way in which 
they should expect to meet t h e i r econ-
omic needs. 
Dr. Karen Horney, r e f e r r i n g to the " d i f -
ference in c u l t u r a l p o s i t i o n s " of men 
and women, has explained t h i s pattern 
as a r e s u l t of the con d i t i o n s under 
which women have l i v e d . 
For centuries love has not only 
been women's s p e c i a l domain in 
l i f e , but in f a c t has been the 
only or main gateway through which 
they could a t t a i n what they de-
s i r e d . While men grew up with the 
c o n v i c t i o n that they had to 
achieve something in l i f e i f they 
wanted to get somewhere, women 
r e a l i z e d that through love, and 
through love alone, could they 
a t t a i n happiness, s e c u r i t y and 
p r e s t i g e . ( 1 ) 
In other words, the expectations and re-
quirements flowing from the t r a d i t i o n a l 
l e g a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of marriage en-
courage at an e a r l y age a d i f f e r e n t i a -
t i o n in l i f e r o l e s based on sex, a l -
though i t has no r a t i o n a l connection 
with the p h y s i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s between 
men and women, or with t h e i r a b i l i t i e s , 
i n t e l l e c t u a l p o t e n t i a l or capacity to 
c o n t r i b u t e to the s o c i e t y . 
The two main r e s u l t s of t h i s are, f i r s t , 
the " c u l t u r a l mold," described by the 
Royal Commission on the Status of 
Women, that s t r i v e s to program young 
women according to the pattern (or sex-
ual stereotype) that the preceeding 
generation found to be an i n t r i n s i c part 
of success in f i n d i n g a marriage p a r t -
ner; and second, the male demand f o r 
p r i o r i t y in educational i n s t i t u t i o n s and 
the economy in general, a p r i o r i t y which 
is v i t a l to the man who, because he is a 
man, must be able to f u l f i l l the legal 
n e c e s s i t y of being able to support a 
f a m i l y i f he is to be an e l i g i b l e mar-
ri a g e partner. 
It may w e l l be asked whether any amount 
of "consciousness r a i s i n g " among women, 
or formal programmes f o r r e q u i r i n g that 
p o s i t i o n s of i n f l u e n c e , power or pres-
t i g e in the economy be a l l o c a t e d on the 
basis of merit r a t h e r than c o n t i n u i n g 
to be based on membership in the male 
sex as the primary q u a l i f i c a t i o n , have 
any chances f o r s i g n i f i c a n t success 
u n t i l some fundamental l e g a l changes 
occur in the b a s i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the sexes--that i s , the law of marriage. 
So long as sexual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d in the l e t t e r and 
s p i r i t of f a m i l y law, we w i l l continue 
to have i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d sexual d i s -
c r i m i n a t i o n across the spectrum of the 
e n t i r e s o c i e t y . 
What i s needed i s a new l e g a l arrange-
ment that makes marriage a true partner-
ship of l e g a l equals. At the same time, 
the new law must be c a r e f u l l y framed so 
as to meet l e g i t i m a t e needs created by 
marriage without i n t e r f e r i n g with 
e x i s t i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s , or with what 
people want. The Law Reform Commission 
of Canada has endeavoured to a r t i c u l a t e 
such an arrangement in i t s Working 
Paper e n t i t l e d Maintenance on Divorce.(2) 
That t i t l e i s misleading s i n c e , when 
dea l i n g with the maintenance r e l a t i o n -
s h i p , we are r e a l l y d e a l i n g with the 
basic l e g a l bargain of marriage, and 
hence the ideas in the paper are o f 
equal s i g n i f i c a n c e to p r o v i n c i a l govern-
ments who have j u r i s d i c t i o n over mar-
riage as they are to the Parliament of 
Canada which i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r d i v o r c e 
law. 
The t r a d i t i o n a l common law philosophy 
of marriage i s that i t i s a purchase by 
a man, in exchange f o r maintenance, of 
an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to the s e r v i c e s , af-
f e c t i o n and s e x u a l i t y of a woman. A 
woman i s not expected in law to be other 
than a dependent and marriage i s i n f a c t 
a r e a l economic goal f o r a woman—par-
t i c u l a r l y in a s o c i e t y where things are 
organized so as to make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r 
her to otherwise provide f o r h e r s e l f . 
Almost a l l other family law f o l l o w s 
from the p r i n c i p l e of purchase in 
the maintenance r u l e . The w i f e re-
t a i n s her u n i l a t e r a l r i g h t to her 
support so long as she behaves h e r s e l f . 
If she commits a d u l t e r y , she i s cut 
o f f from f u r t h e r f i n a n c i a l p r o v i s i o n 
in most provinces, according to the 
common law t r a d i t i o n . This is an i n -
c r e d i b l y harsh penalty in a law that 
is based on the assumption that a 
woman is unable to support h e r s e l f 
(which is the reason f o r the female 
dependency r u l e in the f i r s t p l a c e ) . 
She i s a l s o cut o f f i f she l e a v e s -
she becomes the " d e s e r t e r . " To add i n -
s u l t to i n j u r y , the common law gave, 
and s t i l l gives i n some provinces, a 
deserted husband the r i g h t to sue any-
one who took in his w i f e (who was as-
sumed to be d e s t i t u t e ) enabling him to 
harry her from one p r o t e c t o r to another 
even though he was no longer l i a b l e to 
maintain her himself. 
The only comparable s i t u a t i o n f o r a 
man would be i f the law required him 
to be f i r e d from h i s job or barred from 
h i s p r o f e s s i o n f o r m a r i t a l misconduct, 
and then gave h i s w i f e the r i g h t to sue 
anyone who t h e r e a f t e r gave him employ-
ment . 
Since sexual exc1 usiveness was the 
basis of the bargain, lapses from 
f i d e l i t y can, in many provinces, a l s o 
cost a wi f e her dower r i g h t s , the r i g h t 
to contest her husband's w i l l and the 
r i g h t to receive a f u l l share of h i s 
esta t e i f he dies i n t e s t a t e . Some 
provinces have the rule that the property 
of a w i f e who commits adultery (but not 
the property of an adulterous husband) 
can be taken from her and given to her 
c h i l d r e n . The common law t r a d i t i o n 
contains everything but the s c a r l e t 
l e t t e r . 
There are, then, several interwoven 
themes: an economy that excludes women 
from f u l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and which con-
v e n i e n t l y enables men to use economic 
power to a t t r a c t women; marriage rules 
r e i n f o r c i n g sexual roles that give 
women access to wealth through men at 
the p r i c e of autonomy; and matrimonial 
f a u l t rules that provide economic penal-
t i e s gs a means of con t r o l of female 
b e h a v i o u i — p a r t i c u l a r l y female sexu-
a l i t y — a c c o r d i n g to male i n t e r e s t s and 
concepts of masculine honour. There 
is a l s o the l u r k i n g threat that somehow 
marriage as a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n w i l l 
f a l l apart and Canada w i l l go the way 
of Rome i f these grotesque and a r c h a i c 
t r i b a l concepts are s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l -
tered. And then there i s the pre-
tentious c l a i m by some prominent 
s p i r i t u a l leaders that the r i g i d sexual 
roles and male-dominance and female-
i n f e r i o r i t y stereotypes of mid-
nineteenth century Eng1and--which is 
when our present family law philosophy 
c r y s t a l 1ized--were d i c t a t e d by God in 
accordance with the natural law and 
that moral chaos and s o c i a l c o l l a p s e 
w i l l f o l l o w i f , in B i l l y Graham's 
words, women don't s t i c k to " t h e i r God-
given roles as mothers and homemakers." 
Speaking as a lawyer with no s p i r i t u a l 
p i p e l i n e to give any Divine weight to 
the a n a l y s i s , I suggest that the 
present family legal arrangements are 
a pure man-made product of the economic 
imperatives, moral hypocrisy, c u l t u r a l 
f o l k l o r e , s o c i a l expectations and d i f -
f e r i n g educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r 
men and women as they e x i s t e d in the 
mid- V i c t o r i a n era. Legal rules em-
bodying these V i c t o r i a n concepts and 
serving these V i c t o r i a n needs have been 
projected onto the present day as a 
r e s u l t of the legal philosophy that has 
dominated our courts since the 1850s 
which d i r e c t e d the judges to withdraw 
from t h e i r h i s t o r i c r o l e of l e g i s l a t i v e 
development of the law (lea v i n g that to 
Pariiament), and instead r e s t r i c t e d them 
to the l o g i c a l p e r f e c t i o n of the law as 
they found i t . Even with some j u d i c i a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n , the r a d i c a l s o c i a l and econ-
omic changes of the twentieth century 
have f a r outrun the l i m i t e d mandate 
judges have to depart from precedent. 
The b a l l is in the l e g i s l a t i v e court and 
an examination of the s t a t u t e books 
shows that, l e g i s l a t i v e l y speaking, the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between men and women in 
the le g a l s t r u c t u r e of marriage i s s t i l l 
an amalgam of feudal status concepts 
expanded by the matrimonial f a u l t doc-
t r i n e s of the mediaeval e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 
c o u r t s , a l l n i c e l y brought up to date 
and t i e d together to f i t i n t o V i c t o r i a n 
m o r a l i t y , economics and s o c i a l c e r t a i n -
t i e s . 
The objects of reform of the law of 
marriage and divorc e are to remove from 
that law every s p e c i f i c example of 
sexual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n - - a 1 1 of which are 
inh e r e n t l y suspect and probably u n i -
v e r s a l l y a r b i t r a r y - - a n d to repudiate 
i t s legal t r a d i t i o n of i n v i d i o u s sex-
ual d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . This i s a d i r e c t 
a t t a c k on the idea that marriage i s 
the f i n a n c i a l preserve for women w h i l e 
the job market belongs to men. To do 
t h i s i t is necessary to repeal the f e -
male dependency rul e in a l l provinces 
where i t s t i l l e x i s t s ; to repeal every 
r u l e that e x i s t s as a consequence of 
the female dependency r u l e (that i s , a l l 
the f i n a n c i a l d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s that the 
law places on women fo r m a r i t a l miscon-
duct) ; and f i n a l l y , to a b o l i s h l e g i s l a -
t i v e l y a l l common law precedents that 
are i n c o n s i s t e n t with the new concept 
of legal e q u a l i t y between husbands and 
wives, or that incorporate sexual 
stereotypes about, men's and women's 
roles as legal preconceptions having 
legal consequences. 
If support r i g h t s are no longer to be 
determined by sex, then what should they 
be based on? The answer is that a legal 
r i g h t to a f i n a n c i a l c l a i m on a spouse 
should be based on need. Marriage per se 
does not c r e a t e a need and marriage per 
se t h e r e f o r e should not create a r i g h t 
to support from a spouse. The primary 
basis f o r needs that the law should 
recognize as g i v i n g an enforceable r i g h t 
to support should be the d i v i s i o n of 
f u n c t i o n in the marriage. There are 
three b a s i c f u n c t i o n s to be considered: 
f i n a n c i a l p r o v i s i o n , household management 
and c h i l d care. The law must abandon the 
idea that these are or ought to be 
d i v i d e d along the l i n e s of male bread-
winner-female housekeeper, in favour of 
the view that these are equal r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t i e s of both spouses. 
A spouse who chooses to manage a house-
hold should be c h a r a c t e r i z e d in law as 
r e l i e v i n g the other from a shared respon-
s i b i l i t y so that the other may devote h i s 
or her f u l l energies to making f i n a n -
c i a l p r o y i s i o n . The spouse who be-
comes a f u l l - t i m e paid employee so 
that the other can r a i s e the c h i l d r e n 
should be c h a r a c t e r i z e d in law as re-
1ieving the other from the shared r e -
s p o n s i b M i t y f o r b r i n g i n g in money. 
How the couple d i v i d e s these func-
t i o n s should be no business of the law, 
which would abandon r e l i a n c e on the 
stereotypes of male breadwinner and 
female dependent-housekeeper. 
It i s apparent that wherever there i s 
a d i v i s i o n of f u n c t i o n , the spouse who 
does not have paid employment w i l l have 
a need. This should be l e g a l l y en-
f o r c e a b l e , j u s t as the present support 
o b l i g a t i o n is l e g a l l y enforceable. But 
there w i l l be one major d i f f e r e n c e . 
The new support o b l i g a t i o n would have 
a r a t i o n a l b a s i s . An employed spouse 
would be l e g a l l y o b l i g e d to support a 
spouse who cared f o r c h i l d r e n and 
managed the home not because the l a t t e r 
happened to be female but because there 
was a need created by the way in which 
the couple had arranged t h e i r l i v e s . 
The law would abandon the preconception 
that men must be absent from the home 
in order to make f i n a n c i a l p r o v i s i o n 
fo r the family and leave i t to the mar-
ketplace of human behaviour as to how 
people arrange t h e i r marriages in 
f u t u r e . Whether a couple adopted the 
d i v i s i o n of f u n c t i o n that i s now the 
dominant p a t t e r n , or reversed the pat-
tern would be a r e s u l t of the choice 
made by the spouses according to t h e i r 
a b i l i t i e s , r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , emotional 
needs, economic goals and c u l t u r a l pat-
t e r n s . People could have freedom of 
choice without the coercion of l e g a l l y -
enforced sexual stereotypes, w h i l e 
s t i l l being assured that the law would 
provide f o r economic needs a r i s i n g out 
of the shared experience in the m a r i t a l 
p a r t n e r s h i p . 
Under such a regime i t would no longer 
be p o s s i b l e to c h a r a c t e r i z e marriage 
as s o c i e t y ' s instrument f o r meeting the 
economic needs of women. The e f f e c t 
t h i s would have on the education and 
a t t i t u d e s of young p e o p l e — p a r t i c u l a r l y 
young women—would be profound. It 
would s t r i k e at the heart of the male 
i n s i s t e n c e on p r i o r i t y i n educational 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and the job market. A 
woman seeking employment would have the 
f u l l support of the law in saying that 
her f a m i l y f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
and o b l i g a t i o n s were p r e c i s e l y the same 
as those of a male candidate f o r the 
same jo b . The le g a l support would be 
removed from the p r a c t i c e of denying 
women advancement or an employer's i n -
vestment i n s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g on the 
grounds that they w i l l j u s t get married 
and remove t h e i r s k i l l s from the market. 
They may or may not marry, and i f they 
do, marriage per se w i l l not put them 
in any d i f f e r e n t f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n than 
i t puts a man. 
Several reforms f o l l o w from t h i s . F i r s t , 
in d i v o r c e , maintenance would be re-
h a b i l i t a t i v e and not in the nature of a 
pension. I t would provide f o r the needs 
of a spouse who had been o f f the job 
market and l o s t s e n i o r i t y and s k i l l s 
because he or she had been the household 
manager and the one who cared f o r c h i l -
dren. This r e h a b i l i t a t i v e concept i s 
v i t a l , s i n c e i t i s aimed d i r e c t l y at the 
idea that a l l a woman has to do in the 
way of l i f e preparation i s ensure that 
she marries, a f t e r which she w i l l be 
taken care of f o r l i f e . 
Maintenance amounts would be based on 
reasonable needs and not on "the s t y l e 
in which she was accustomed to be kept." 
This i s again aimed at e l i m i n a t i n g a 
legal concept of marriage as a sub-
s t i t u t e f o r i n d i v i d u a l achievement or 
as an a l t e r n a t i v e to seeking t r a i n i n g 
and education f o r the s t a t i o n in l i f e 
to which an i n d i v i d u a l a s p i r e s . 
If maintenance i s to be based on need, 
then, by d e f i n i t i o n , i t can no longer be 
a quid pro quo exchanged f o r female sex-
ual e x c l u s i v e n e s s . I t f o l l o w s that 
matrimonial f a u l t would no longer be a 
co n s i d e r a t i o n in maintenance awards on 
di v o r c e . The law's idea that one spouse 
or the other i s "at f a u l t " o r " t o blame" 
when a marriage breaks down i s meaning-
less to behavioural s c i e n t i s t s . To say 
that the whole i n t e r a c t f o n between a 
couple over the span o f a marriage can 
be n e a t l y p o l a r i z e d i n t o l e g a l c a t e -
gories of " g u i l t " and "innocence," and 
that g u i l t can be f i t t e d i n t o e i t h e r 
c r u e l t y or a d u l t e r y , and that the lega l 
process can a s c e r t a i n g u i l t and inno-
cence w i t h any hope o f accuracy i s 
simply preposterous. To a l l o w f i n a n c i a l 
r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s on d i v o r c e or 
a f t e r a marriage breakdown to f o l l o w 
from a determination that i s so fraught 
with u n c e r t a i n t y would do no more than 
compound the human s u f f e r i n g that r e -
s u l t s from a le g a l philosophy that is 
so fundamentally d e f i c i e n t i n the f i r s t 
pi ace. 
The need to e l i m i n a t e f a u l t and subjec-
t i v e t e s t s of conduct cannot be overem-
phasized. One p r o v i n c i a l law reform 
commission r e c e n t l y suggested that main-
tenance o b l i g a t i o n s should be based on 
needs, means, a b i l i t i e s and so on, and 
that conduct should be one of many f a c -
t o r s considered by the c o u r t . Presum-
ably the maintenance payable to a needy 
spouse would be reduced or e l i m i n a t e d 
on the ba s i s of f a u l t . If conduct i s 
l e f t on anybody's l i s t , i t w i l l not only 
perpetuate the idea that the le g a l nature 
of marriage i s s t i l l a purchase t r a n s -
a c t i o n o f the behaviour o f one spouse by 
the economic power of the oth e r , but i t 
w i l l a l s o be the gate through which i s 
dragged seven hundred years of i n v i d -
ious sexual d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against 
women. The whole weight of le g a l pre-
cedent on f a u l t i s anti-female and 
puni t i v e . 
The P r o v i n c i a l Deserted Wives and 
Chi l d r e n ' s Maintenance Acts not only 
can but should be scrapped in favour 
of p r o v i n c i a l marriage breakdown l e g i s -
l a t i o n , in which the courts give up the 
leg a l f i c t i o n o f searching f o r d e s e r t i o n 
and other forms of matrimonial f a u l t . 
Instead o f asking who manoeuvered whom 
in t o l e a v i n g , or who i s the discovered 
adulterous spouse, the courts should 
ask "which spouse, i f e i t h e r , has an 
economic need a r i s i n g out of t h i s 
broken marriage, and how long w i l l i t 
take the needy spouse to become s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t ? " Needless to say, t h i s i s 
p r e c i s e l y the same approach suggested 
f o r the Divorce Act by the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada. 
It should be noted that more than one 
f a c t o r has been suggested by the Law 
Reform Commission as the basis f o r i n -
terspousal maintenance. The concern of 
t h i s paper has been to e x p l a i n the Com-
mission's philosophy, which can most 
ac c u r a t e l y or conveniently be under-
stood by cons i d e r i n g the concept of 
maintenance being based on needs a r i s -
ing out of the d i v i s i o n of fu n c t i o n in 
a marriage. Of equal weight, however, 
would be needs a r i s i n g out of c u s t o d i a l 
arrangements made respecting c h i l d r e n ; 
the needs created by an express or 
t a c i t agreement that one spouse w i l l 
maintain the other, and needs f o l l o w -
ing from phy s i c a l or mental d i s a b i l i t y 
or the i n a b i l i t y to f i n d work. Note 
that no concession i s made to the idea 
that there i s any need that f o l l o w s 
from the f a c t of being female. 
Maintenance on marriage breakdown would 
be r e h a b i l i t a t i v e , f o r the r a t i o n a l 
purpose of enabling a needy former 
spouse to become s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t again, 
j u s t as, i s required of every other un-
married person. If the need is perman-
ent, however, maintenance could and 
would be permanent. 
Fault should simply disappear from the 
maintenance equation. Needs caused by 
the dependency experience of a spouse 
during marriage, r e s u l t i n g from arrange-
ments that have r e l i e v e d the employed 
spouse from part of the shared respon-
s i b i l i t i e s , are not magically reduced 
or e liminated by f a u l t . Fault concepts 
a f f e c t i n g maintenance r i g h t s are, a l -
ways have been and always w i l l be as 
a r b i t r a r y as the law that presumes to 
be able to discover who caused the 
marriage breakdown. Apart from deter-
mining f i n a n c i a l r i g h t s , f a u l t concepts 
serve mainly to give disenchanted 
spouses s t i c k s to beat each other w i t h , 
and as bargaining levers in disputes 
over property and c h i l d r e n . It i s be-
yond b e l i e f that we should s e r i o u s l y 
contemplate r e t a i n i n g the degrading 
d o c t r i n e of l e g a l f a u l t and the i n -
humane s u f f e r i n g that i t causes f o r 
even one day longer than i s needed to 
banish i t forever from the h a l l s of 
j ust i c e . 
In another Working Paper,(3)the Fed-
e r a l Commission has pointed out the 
n e c e s s i t y for laws p r o v i d i n g f o r 
equal property sharing on div o r c e , 
which, taken with the new maintenance 
concept, w i l l ensure as f a r as the 
law i s reasonably able, that the 
economically p e n a l i z i n g consequences of 
provid i n g f u l l - t i m e care to c h i l d r e n 
w i l l be el i m i n a t e d . 
A l l of t h i s i s only a part of the job 
that must be done by the law on behalf 
of the Canadian f a m i l y . These steps 
'must be coupled with a massive e f f o r t 
by governments and the p r i v a t e s e c t o r 
to attack and root out sexual d i s c r i m -
i n a t i o n wherever i t e x i s t s . And there 
i s an absolute requirement f o r i n t e r -
governmental cooperation in f a m i l y 
law reform of a nature and on a s c a l e 
that is unprecedented in t h i s country. 
The needs of the family u n f o r t u n a t e l y 
do not f o l l o w the neat d i v i s i o n of 
l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y between p a r l i a -
ment and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s in 
Sections 91 and 92 of the B r i t i s h 
North America Act. 
The l a s t sentence of the Commission's 
Working Paper on Maintenance sums up 
the task that 1ies ahead: 
The removal of obstacles to the 
development of a new Canadian 
ethos of s o c i o - l e g a l e q u a l i t y 
f o r a l l married persons requires 
co-ordinated a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n 
by a l l governments and l e g i s l a -
tures in Canada.(k) 
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